Major Aspects of Weber’s methodology,

Major Aspects of Weber’s methodology,

Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. The genesis and context of Weber's Methodology
  3. Verstehen and Science
  4. Causality
  5. Objectivity
  6. Ideal Types
  7. Values
  8. Conclusion

Introduction

Max Weber was undoubtedly one of the most brilliant intellectuals among the early organizers of sociological thought. A general evaluation of Weber's writings demonstrates his historical understanding of modern Western societies and their economic, political, legal and religious development. Among other things, Weber has written extensively on social science methodology, but his writings on methodology are complex and subject to many conflicting interpretations. It is Weber's methodology that has been widely read, discussed, discussed, sometimes accepted, and often refuted for its inconsistencies.

Weber's approach to social theory was central to his overall work. Overall, Weber was a modernist in his comprehensive approach to social thought. In light of the two other classical sociologists, Marx and Durkheim, Weber had a modernist perspective, which was also reflected in his methodology. By bringing together different traditions of social theory, Weber formed a unique theoretical perspective based on history, economics, philosophy, law, and comparative historical analysis (Morrison, 2006). Moreover, compared to Marx and Durkheim, Weber's approach was not only more individualistic but also more cultural. And both aspects, individualism and cultural orientation, stand out prominently in Weber's perspective on social science methodology. We begin this article by examining key aspects of Weber's methodology that are particularly unique to Weber's work and that remain a subject of agreement, disagreement, and speculation today. The following are examined: Historical background of Weber's views on methodological issues in the social sciences, understanding and science, causality, objectivity, ideal types and values ​​- relevance of values ​​and neutrality of values. All of the subsections contained here are not hermetic compartments, but together represent Weber's methodology for the social sciences.

Weber’s methodology

Weber's methodology, with its modernist perspective, has been excessively debated among sociologists for a variety of reasons. Its methodology has always been given special attention in Max Weber's “The Questioning” because it can seem unclear, confused and at the same time passionate, authoritative and complete (Torrance, 1974). Weber was known to be a complete opponent of pure, abstract theorizing. Insofar as Weber's theoretical ideas are rooted in his empirical, mainly historical research (Ritzer, 2011). Weber's social science methodology was not only unique to him, but also a very important contribution to the study of society, which seems to have influenced many later scholars. It was between 1902 and 1903 that Weber wrote a series of essays questioning the methodology of research in the social sciences. Specifically, the term "methodology" refers to the procedures and principles of research in a particular discipline to obtain knowledge about society. Unlike the natural sciences, the methods used in the social sciences are not as clear and simple. An important stage in that period was the development of the social sciences. In this context, it became important for Weber to distinguish between social science methods and natural science methods. Therefore, two works by Weber stand out as being of central importance for the development of his methodological views: firstly, a work entitled Roscher und Knies: The Logical Problems of Historical Economics, written between 1902/03, and secondly , a work entitled "Objectivity in the Social Sciences and Social Policy", written between 1903 and 1904 (Morrison, 2006). It is in this last work that Weber discusses at length the aspects of objectivity within the framework of the methodology of social sciences.

Weber's methodology should be understood to mean that, despite his work as a lawyer and economist, he was strongly inclined to study history. Weber suggested developing clear concepts in order to be able to carry out a causal analysis of historical phenomena. Therefore, Weber's perspective and methodology was a fusion of historical and sociological orientations. For Weber, historical sociology was concerned with both individuality and generality. To achieve this unification, there has been the development and use of general concepts (known as "ideal types") when studying particular individuals, events, or societies (Ritzer, 2011). With the help of these general concepts, one could then arrive at the individuality of each development, and thus determine the causes of the differences between those developments.

The genesis and context of Weber's Methodology

Weber's methodological work was a direct response to his immediate situation. Between 1880 and 1900, the natural sciences in Europe experienced spectacular growth. Knowledge of physics, biology and chemistry, as well as experimental discoveries, steadily progressed. Scientific methodology has thus become dominant within the scholarly community. This was followed by a decline in the scholarly tradition of historical and philosophical science in explaining the nature of reality (Morrison, 2006). Moreover, at the turn of the 19th century, most social scientists and historians were strong supporters of the broad tradition of historicism. In the tradition of historicism, reality was seen as a historical product. However, historicism has a strong hostility to abstract concepts (Eliaeson, 2002). Attacking the natural sciences and defending the social sciences, especially the historicists in Germany, became the basis of the famous method dispute - the method controversy on the question of the preference between a historical and a theoretical approach.

This eventually led to an open battle between the natural sciences and the social sciences, which challenged the foundations of knowledge and thus drew attention to the differences between the methodology of the natural sciences and the methodology of the social sciences. The unscientific character of the historical and social sciences has been widely criticized. With a general crisis around 1885, a re-examination of the relationship between scientific method and philosophy took place. Around 1890, a movement popularly known as neo-Kantianism (a return to the work of Immanuel Kant) arose to address the issue and thereby challenge the validity of scientific knowledge itself (Morrison, 2006). Neo-Kantianism can be considered the first truly secularized modern scientific methodology (Eliaeson, 2002). Morrison, 2006). . These two scholars, alongside the influences of Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel—all close friends of Weber—seem to have had a tremendous impact on Weber's thinking about social science methodology. Weber's methodology was tied to the relationship between history and sociology. For this, he is also known as a historical sociologist (Ritzer, 2011). Weber began to develop his own methodological position by attempting to resolve methodological theoretical conflicts in the social sciences. In a series of methodological essays written between 1903 and 1906, Weber sketched the methodological foundations of the social sciences. Weber crystallized the methodological controversy step by step by pointing out the fundamental differences between the natural sciences and the social sciences. For Weber, the social sciences must, among other things, arrive at a methodology that includes both general and individual aspects of historical reality, a procedure he called the "ideal type" (Morrison, 2006).

In Rickert's theory of knowledge, he used the concept of "value-relevance," which Weber took over for topics in the social sciences. According to Rickert, since judgment comes before knowledge, knowledge itself was a kind of appreciation. Furthermore, Rickert argued that it is impossible to make judgments about reality without concepts. Therefore, knowledge of the empirical world without concepts was also impossible. Value relevance has become so important in the subject of social sciences. According to the principle of value relevance, Rickert observed, knowledge is not only what is observable, but at the same time, and above all, a construction of the object to be described (Morrison, 2006). For Weber knowledge can never be a reproduction of reality. Reality for Weber was infinite and inexhaustible (Freund, 1968). And thus neither the generalizing nor the individualizing research methods were adequate for Weber's understanding of the theory of knowledge. Both methods have their limitations, which Weber intended to overcome by proposing his Methodology of the Social Sciences.

Verstehen And Science

Comprehension, a German word, means understanding. Originally, the term finds its origin in theological hermeneutics. The concept of interpretative comprehension, that is, understanding, was central to the methodological debates of German historians and sociologists during Weber's time. The characteristic hostility of German historians and sociologists to the 'positivist' social thought of France and England was the context in which the idea of ​​interpretative understanding gained prominence (Eliaeson, 2002). It is this contribution to methodology that is among Weber's best known and most controversial work in sociology. Weber's ideas about comprehension were relatively common among German historians of his time and are believed to have come from hermeneutics (a field with a specialized approach to understanding and interpreting published writings).

Of course, Weber did not invent this method, but simply tried to extend this idea of ​​understanding texts to understanding social life (Ritzer, 2011). It is absolutely clear that for Weber understanding was not the subtle intuitive sympathy favored by philosophers, but the intellectual, analytical and premonitory explanation of action (Sahay, 1971a). It was therefore not the emotional understanding of social action, but an intellectual understanding of social action in a given context. For Weber, sociology was a science (Eldridge, 1971) and could be verified scientifically. And with it the scientific and objective treatment of the subjective understanding of all social action. The term was not psychological for Weber. Weber used the term to refer to the social scientist's attempt to understand both the intention and the context of human action (Elwell, 2003). On the other hand, “science” is concerned with explaining “what is” and therefore determining its causes (Freund, 1968).

For Weber, understanding did not consist of intuition or empathy, a common misconception generally held by many critics. It involved systematic and rigorous research and was therefore rational and scientific. By understanding, Weber meant an interpretative understanding of subjective motivations, of social action, since it is only in an actor's head what he means by a specific action. Therefore, according to Weber, sociology should pay attention to that specific context in which the actor performs a given social action. This context and action can only acquire meaning through the application of verstehen, i.e. understanding the actor's context and action. There is something extraordinarily interesting about Weber's interpretation of verstehen. The phenomenon of verstehen is interpreted both at a cultural level (e.g. structural functionalism) and at an individual level (e.g. symbolic interactionism), influencing different theoretical perspectives (Ritzer, 2011). There are differing opinions on how Weber himself interpreted it and there is no clear agreement on this. The fact remains, however, that it is through such contributions that Weber occupies a central role in sociological theory. And Weber's contribution to understanding aspects of social research seems to diverge in interpretivism as a theoretical paradigm

Causality

As part of his methodology, Weber devoted himself to the study of causality. He was inclined to study the causes of social phenomena—an endeavor in which he again combines the general (nomothetic) and peculiar (idiographic) approaches of the positivists and subjectivists, respectively. For Weber, causality was the probability that one event was followed or accompanied by another event. Much more than historical constants, repetitions, parallels, according to Weber it was a question of looking at the reasons and the meaning of historical changes. In most of his historical works he operated from a multicausal approach (Ritzer, 2011). Consider, for example, his study of the relationship between Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism, where he considered the Protestant ethic as one of the causal factors in the rise of the modern spirit of capitalism.

For Weber, the issue of causation was not resolved in a one-way model, but he was sensitive to the links between a number of social factors. Moreover, his thinking about causality was also strongly influenced by his belief in having (understanding) a particular understanding of social life, which ultimately distinguishes causal knowledge of the social sciences from causal knowledge of the natural sciences (Ritzer, 2011 ). This puts the social sciences in a better position than the natural sciences because of their emphasis on understanding human behavior.

Objectivity

For any view of the social sciences, the idea of ​​objectivity remains crucial. Weber is undoubtedly seen as the benchmark for the doctrine of an objective social science. However, what is interesting about Weber's position on objectivity in the social sciences is his method of achieving this goal (Eliaeson, 2002).

Using ideal types and accepting one's subjectivity (value relevance), Weber advocated objectivity in the social sciences. For Weber, the starting point was "relevance over value." Weber argued that in having value-relevant starting points, the historian need not be objective. However, the causal link between the means and the end must be demonstrated objectively. Such causal relationships can be established using "ideal types". By clarifying our values ​​from the outset, real objectivity becomes possible. Subjectivity would then result from the suppression of such points of view. Paradoxically, the choice of relevant ideal-types is as much a subjective choice as the choice of points of view of reference (Rex, 1971).

Let us therefore recall that Weber does not objectively equate it with the neutrality of values ​​(Dawe, 1971). As we will see later, value neutrality is only advocated in the later stages of social research, while objectivity must be maintained throughout research to make social research increasingly scientific. In other words, value relevance, especially in research selection, can provide the desired objectivity.

Ideal Types

Weber's methodology revolves primarily around “the conceptualization and also the problem of producing intersubjectively meaningful choices from a vast and infinite reality” (Eliaeson, 2002: 46). The first formulation of the concept of ideal types arose during the thought of Weber as an economic historian and still under the influence of the German historian Heinrich Rickert (Rex, 1971). Weber's concept of the "ideal type" was first developed by him in a 1905 paper titled "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy." The theorist who influenced Weber in formulating his ideal type theory was Heinrich Rickert. Since Rickert preferred general and individual concepts, Weber rejected Rickert's theory and formulated his ideal types as an epistemological response to Rickert's theory (Hekman, 1983). Weber defined the ideal type as a "conceptual model that brings together specific relationships and historical events into a complex whole whose purpose is to describe historical societies by comparing their internal and external characteristics". Weber used the “ideal type” as a methodological concept, a technique for describing the comparative characteristics of different societies by describing their distinct social characteristics (Morrison, 2006). In fact, these ideal types play a central theoretical role in Weber's work, and not just in empirical research.

For Weber, the task of sociologists was to develop conceptual tools to understand empirical reality. However, these concepts are only tools and should not be confused with reality itself. The ideal type was one of these important conceptual tools:
An ideal is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct. . . . In its conceptual purity, this mental construct . . . cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality.It is a utopia. (Weber, 1903-17/1949:90; italics authors’)
The ideal type can be considered as a sum of concepts that the researcher constructs for pure research purposes. Just as reality is infinite, Weber affirms that no concept can transmit to us all the multiplicity of the phenomenon (Freund, 1968). However, Weber offers the "ideal type" as a solution. The term denotes ideal, typical, distinctive, characteristic or essential characteristics or elements of the phenomenon. It must be remembered that “ideal” does not mean ethical, ie it has nothing to do with exemplary. At a basic level, an ideal type is a conceptual construction of a social scientist based on his interests and theoretical orientation, in order to capture the essential characteristics of a social phenomenon (Ritzer, 2011). The ideal type is a model, not a hypothesis, even if specific hypotheses can be derived from it, for comparison with empirical "facts" (Lindbekk, 1992). Thus, ideal types are like parameters that facilitate our understanding of the essential features of a particular phenomenon. Though constructed by social scientists, ideal types are not illogical. At the same time, as Weber suggests calling it a utopia, such a concept only seeks to understand the social phenomenon in a form prescribed (by the social scientist) and therefore cannot claim to represent empirical historical reality. In this sense, Weber makes it clear through what he does not want to be an ideal type.

Indeed, the concept of ideal type is the realization of the principle of sociological rationality advanced by Weber as his fundamental and original contribution to scientific analysis (Sahay, 1971a). For Weber, ideal types as heuristic devices, not laws, are meant to facilitate empirical research to understand specific aspects of the social world. Weber also proposes deriving ideal types inductively from the real world, rather than deductively deriving them from an abstract theory such as a carefully defined set of concepts. This, Weber says, will not help the social scientist understand the social phenomenon. In the real world, however, Weber does not suggest ideal types as mirror images, but rather one-sided exaggerations of the essence of a social phenomenon, neither too general nor too specific. For Weber, science means endless research (Freund, 1968) and because he believed in the non-existence of timeless concepts in the social sciences, he advocated the development of new typologies to adapt to constantly changing societies (Ritzer, 2011). This, Weber argues, allows a researcher to escape his own subjectivity, since ideal types reflect it very objectively.

Concepts in the ideal type are not only 'pure', 'exaggerated' or 'one-sided', but should also have a dynamic and causal aspect within the society under consideration. Weber used the word "teleological" in his first presentation of the ideal-typical approach (Lindbekk, 1992). Despite his clear definition, however, Weber was considered inconsistent in his use of ideal types in his substantive works. Ritzer (2011) reiterates the different categories/variations of Weber's ideal types as follows:
1. Historical ideal types–relates to any phenomena that existed in a particular historical period.
2. General sociological ideal types –relates to phenomena cutting across many historical periods and society.
3. Action ideal types –pure types of action based on actor’s motivations.
4. Structural ideal types–forms taken by the causes and consequences of social action 

According to Weber, an ideal type can help reveal the true meaning and meaning of the action, which may seem different from the subjective meaning that the actor himself attributes to the action (Eliaeson, 2002). As heuristic tools, Weber's ideal types have therefore been an equally important contribution to social science methodology, despite their contradictions.

Values

Value attribution has always remained the basis of Weber's sociological analysis (Dawe, 1971). Weber's notion of sociology without values ​​has greatly influenced modern sociological thought on the role of values ​​in the social sciences. In fact, Max Weber is considered the patron saint of valueless sociology (Farganis, 1974). Although very complicated, Weber's views on values ​​are often viewed universally, as social scientists should not let their personal values ​​influence their scientific research. Weber had specific values ​​in both teaching and research. With little ambiguity about value freedom in this aspect, Weber argues that scholars should not express their personal values ​​in a classroom setting. Only the facts must be declared. Unlike Marx, Weber believed in a possible separation of facts and values ​​(Ritzer, 2011). Moreover, Weber also did not emphasize the facts of social reality, but rather its defining quality: value, meaning, and meaning (Sahay, 1971b).

However, Weber's position on freedom of value in social research is much more ambiguous. Interestingly, Weber did not recommend the complete elimination of values ​​from social search. By restricting the notion of freedom from values, Weber was not speaking of a complete avoidance of values, but was proposing a seemingly paradoxical solution in which values ​​could be used to promote objectivity rather than subjectivity (Eliaeson, 2002). According to Weber, values ​​only play a role in certain aspects of research. In other words, the values ​​must be taken into account before actually starting the search. Data collection itself should not be mixed or influenced by values ​​of any kind. The selection of a particular study for research can be harmlessly influenced by the values ​​of the researcher. This brings us back to one of Weber's methodological concepts, the relevance of value, also borrowed from the work of the German historian Heinrich Rickert. It means that researchers' choice of a particular study is influenced by their values ​​relevant to their particular society to which they belong (Ritzer, 2011). Thus we see that while Weber advocates a complete avoidance of values ​​(of academics) with regards to classroom teaching, he is more considered in the case of social inquiry, limiting the role of values ​​only to the initial stages of the process. she studies.

In Weber's 1917 essay, "The Meaning of Ethical Neutrality in Sociology and Economics," he argues that value conflicts cannot be resolved by rational means (Eliaeson, 2002). Consequently, rational reasoning cannot help resolve problems arising from value conflicts. Value neutrality was thus as important as value relevance. According to Weber, the social sciences should not distance themselves completely from values. For Weber, value orientation had nothing to do with a value judgment or an (ethical) evaluation of the phenomenon. In fact, value orientation, Weber argues, determines the questions we ask of reality. With this awareness, a researcher is able to acquire limited objective knowledge (Freund, 1968). However, Weber's qualification of valuelessness (or value neutrality) to value relevance (or value orientation) has subsequently been misused and misunderstood (Eliaeson, 2002). Therefore, like other aspects of Weber's work, issues arising from value neutrality and value relevance are highly contentious.

Conclusion

Weber is not only a great classical sociologist, but also a refined contribution to the methodology of the social sciences. There is no denying the fact that there have been generations of scholars who have provided us with translations and interpretations of Weber's works, especially his methodology. Weber's contribution to theoretical ideas, which are also largely shaped by his methodical thinking, should not be underestimated. In all attempts at such interpretations, we see the contradictions and confusions that scholars encounter when interpreting Weber's methodological writings. Despite these problematic interpretations of Weber's work, he still occupies the position of one of the greatest sociologists who contributed both methodological and substantive theoretical ideas in sociology. Interestingly, Weber was not a "methodologist", he was a historical sociologist. Indeed, Weber began writing down his ideas in the form of essays on social science methodology at a time when he was not recognized as a sociologist, even by himself. Weber was a lawyer and economist with a penchant for history. However, Weber has become famous in sociology for his contributions, both methodological and theoretical. Weber's ideal type remains an important conceptual tool as this methodological position has been put forward by several sociologists, for example Alfred Schutz. 

However, many consider Weber's ideal types to be a completely outdated term that no longer fits the current situation. But at a time when there was great emphasis on the adoption of scientific methods in the social sciences, Weber's ideal types, together with understanding and objectivity, were in fact a scholarly contribution that gave concrete direction to the social science methodology. Weber's view of the importance of understanding in all social research has been of great importance ever since. For Weber, understanding can result from the ability to decipher the meaning actors attach to their actions and interactions. However,

Weber's methodology is still debated by various scholars. Indeed, the countless interpretations and debates surrounding Weber's works only demonstrate the extent to which his works are read and interpreted. Weber's ideal types, meaning, understanding, and social action work together as a solution to the methodological debates of his time.

References

  1. Dawe, Alan. (1971). The Relevance of Values. In Arun Sahay (Ed.), Max Weber and Modern Sociology (pp. 37-66). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
  2. Eldridge, J. E. T. (Ed.). (1971). Max Weber: The Interpretation of Social Reality. Great Britain: Nelson's University Paperbacks. 
  3. Eliaeson, Sven. (2002). Max Weber's Methodologies: Interpretation and Critique. USA: Polity Press.
  4. Farganis, James. (1974). An Exposition of Weber's Approach to Verstehende Soziologie. Sociological Focus, 7(4), 66-87. 
  5. Freund, Julien. (1968). The Sociology of Max Weber. USA: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 
  6. Hekman, Susan J. (1983). Weber's Ideal Type: A Contemporary Reassessment. Polity, 16(1), 119-137. 
  7. Lindbekk, Tore. (1992). The Weberian Ideal-Type: Development and Continuities. Acta Sociologica, 35(4), 285-297. 
  8. Morrison, Ken. (2006). Marx, Durkheim, Weber: Formations of Modern Social Thought (Second ed.). New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
  9. Rex, John. (1971). Typology and Objectivity: A Comment on Weber's Four Sociological Methods. In Arun Sahay (Ed.), Max Weber and Modern Sociology (pp. 17-36). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

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