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Sociology: The ‘Neo’ in Functionalism

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Contents

  1. Towards a Synthetic Approach
  2. As Continuity or Critique of Functionalism?
  3. A Glimpse of Luhmann’s Social System Analysis 
  4. Luhmann versus Parsons’ System Analysis
  5. Conclusion

Towards a Synthetic Approach

According to Ritzer (2011), the strength and appeal of Parsonian theory lies in its ability to integrate different dimensions of the social world, viz. social, cultural and personality. However, towards the end of his career, his approach began to value the cultural system more than others, so that other systems came to be seen as determined by the cultural system. At this point, neofunctionalism asserts its theoretical importance in sociology.

Alexander remarked in the mid-1980s that neofunctionalism was a "trend rather than a developed theory" (Alexander quoted in Ritzer 2011: 252). Some of the characteristics of neofunctionalism can be noted as follows. First, neofunctionalism offers a "descriptive view of society" that views society as composed of different components, each of which forms patterns of interaction. Such a view seeks the multidimensional causality of phenomena and is open-ended (Ritzer 2011). Neofunctionalism considers the macro and micro forms of social phenomena. It offers a general conception of action that includes both the “rational” and “expressive” content of actions. It is very important that it has been emphasized that conflict situations are seen as part of the social system. "There is concern for balance in neofunctional lasism, but it is broader than structural-functional concern and includes both mobile and partial balance" (Ritzer 2011). Neofunctionalism does not adhere to the concept of “static equilibrium” (Ritzer 2011). Finally, Ritzer (2011) argues that change is not brought about by compliant and harmonious resettlement, but often by “individuation and institutional tensions” (Ritzer 2011). Thus, the difference between neofunctionalism and the structural-functionalist approach was that it was not tied to an overall conceptual edifice, but was open to ideas from exchange theory, symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, etc. Alexander and Colomy note that neofunctionalism is a “loosely organized whole” with a number of “proliferations and variations at different levels and in different empirical domains” (Alexander and Colomy cited in Ritzer 2011).

Thus, the main features or "tendencies" of neofunctionalism can be summarized as follows (Alexander quoted in Wallace and Wolf 1995):
  1. To create a form of functionalism that is multidimensional and includes micro and macro levels of analysis 
  2. To push functionalism to the left and reject Parsons‟ optimism about modernity 
  3. To argue for an implicit democratic thrust in functional analysis
  4. To incorporate a conflict orientation 
  5. To emphasize contingency (uncertainty) and interactional creativity‟ (Wallace and Wolf 1995 :68).
It can be concluded that neofunctionalism recognized the futility of a one-sided emphasis on analysis at the macro or micro level and underwent a qualitative shift in the 1980s towards recognizing the importance of both. This shift towards a synthetic approach has also manifested itself in the work of other sociologists such as Giddens and Habermas.

As Continuity or Critique of Functionalism?

Neofunctionalism developed amid criticisms of structural functionalism. It contained the "double element of continuity and internal critique" of earlier functionalism (Alexander 1998: 54). Jeffrey Alexander and Paul Colomy define neofunctionalism as "a self-critical strand of functional theory that seeks to expand the intellectual scope of functionalism while retaining its theoretical core" (1985: 11). Thus, it seems clear that Alexander and Colomy view structural functionalism as extremely narrow. The goal of neofunctionalists is to create a more synthetic theory (Ritzer 2011: 261). It is argued that while Parsonian functionalism was initially synthetic in nature, as evidenced by his systemic AGIL approach, his theory gradually adopted a narrow cultural reductionist approach in his later work (Ritzer 2011). This worries a new group of thinkers, supporters of the functionalist or neo-functionalist approach.

Alexander, Colomy, Richard Munch and Luhmann are among the well-known neofunctionalists. Alexander suggested that Parsons' analytical model was one of the most important contributions of sociologists (Collins 1997). Classical sociological thinkers like Marx, Durkheim and Weber had emphasized only one dimension of social reality. For example, Marx spoke only of the material conditions leading to class struggle and was concerned with economic determinism. Alexander emphasized Parsons' multidimensional approach, which is so essential to any social analysis. According to Alexander, critics of Parsons' functional approach, namely theorists of the conflict school and the phenomenological school, failed to see how their approaches fit into Parsons' larger analytic framework. Thus, conflict theory reduces everything to economics and politics and the phenomenological school reduces social analysis to the level of the individual, culture and interaction, leaving out the macro level of analysis. These gaps, according to Alexander, can be incorporated into the Parsonian model of analysis (Collins 1997). Randall Collins (1997) argues that Alexander, unlike his critics, "attempted to purify it in the light of modern post-positivist philosophy and to introduce the insights of conflict theory and phenomenology" (1997: 73). A similarity between Parsons (functionalism) and Alexander (neo-functionalism) is that both appeal to classical sociologists such as Durkheim, for example in arguing that underlying any utilitarian action that appears on the surface to be driven by self-interest is actually the result of "common values ​​or shared understanding of how to achieve goals" (Collins 1997:73).

In keeping with his goal of establishing a multidimensional theory of action, Alexander also incorporates elements of Marx's theory of conflict. However, Collins (1997) criticizes this by stating that Alexander does not clearly mark the starting point of the Marxist model of analysis, indeed Collins argues that Alexander is far from developing a complete systems theory. However, there are important lessons to be learned from Parsons' mistakes, as Alexander has pointed out. According to Alexander, as noted by Collins, one must remember that there is a distinction between abstract analytical dimensions of any theory and empirical phenomena. They shouldn't be confused. Furthermore, one should not only value the empirical aspect of any theory, but understand that analytical concepts can become even more valuable for analyzing social phenomena. For example, Collins observes how Parsons confused the analytic concept of values ​​by localizing it empirically, ignoring the fact that values ​​are not generalizable and often vary over time. For Collins, therefore, "the analytical importance of values ​​should be to point out to us the mechanisms which produce them in each situation, so that we can examine to what extent they are produced and how they may fit into class situations. Politics". conflict, domination, and other less-than-ideal real-life phenomena. Analytically and not concretely, values ​​become a tool in an analysis of social conflicts” (1997: 74). Thus, the section above makes it clear that neofunctionalism is both a continuation and a critique of classical functionalism.

A Glimpse of Luhmann’s Social System Analysis 

Luhmann drew on theorists from different schools of thought. His work stems from Husserl's phenomenology, its revision by Derrida's deconstruction, Weiner's theories of cybernetics, representations of emergence and self-organization (autopoiesis) from biology and functional representations structural features of Parson's social system. For Luhmann, a social system encompasses meaningful actions and interrelationships between people and is thus distinct from the environment (Wallace and Wolf 1995: 70). There are three types of social systems he talks about – face-to-face interaction systems of people, organizational system in which membership is conditional, and societal systems. However, Luhmann notes that these systems are not mutually exclusive and that social action cuts across all three systems. But in simple societies there is a stronger interdependence of the three social systems. As societies become larger and more complex, these three systems become more distinct and disparate (Turner 2007). The concreteness of the social system depends on how complexity reduction mechanisms are used in societies. Referring to Luhmann, Turner (2007) states that there are three dimensions under which complexities are approached. First is the time dimension, which combines past and present complexities and extends into the future. So mechanisms must be in place to direct people's actions in the temporal field. Second, there may be complexities in the material dimension of the environment with respect to issues of order in the different kinds of actions people take in physical space. Third, is there concern about which symbolic forms of communication become more important than others and how symbols are chosen to organize social actions? Thus, the complexities around these three dimensions are resolved by the social system and this in turn would determine how the social system can separate itself from the environment.

As the three social systems become more and more differentiated, this begins to pose problems for the system. "Bottlenecks" in social systems occur, for example, when there are conflicting views on the system of interaction. This could affect organizational efficiency and the proper functioning of the social system. However, Luhmann notes that despite the existence of potential disruptions, "there are processes that work to maintain social integration" (Turner 2007: 107). Another interesting point, which according to Turner (2007) is a major contribution by Luhmann, is that, unlike classical functionalists like Parsons and Durkheim, he does not call for the acceptance of social norms and values ​​as fundamental to the maintenance of order. In fact, according to Luhmann, there is disagreement about values ​​and norms, and it is not a defect or “pathological”, to use Durkheim's term. “The impersonality and neutrality of many encounters in complex systems can be considered normal and analyzed less critically” (Turner 2007: 109). Even when systems become more differentiated, they create a lack of 'emotional integration', which provides individuals with the space and flexibility to pursue different options and not be bound by tradition (ibid.).

Luhmann versus Parsons’ System Analysis

Luhmann criticized Parsons' strict AGIL model, which reduced the "dynamics of systems analysis by unifying it as a quadruple table" and instead emphasized "the tension between the internal and external systems environment"; Luhmann therefore "developed a more flexible and dynamic model" (Alexander 1998: 68). Luhmann's deep involvement with Parsons' works underscores the absence of any mention of 'self-reference' and 'complexity' in his works (Wallace and Wolf 1995: 69). Ritzer (2011) explains that, according to Luhmann, society's ability to refer to itself is fundamental to our understanding of society as a system» (Ritzer 2011: 336). Furthermore, Luhmann criticizes Parsons for his failure to capture contingency as part of his grand theory. This, according to Luhmann, is inadequate, since Parsons analyzes "modern society as it is" and overlooks that it could be otherwise (Ritzer 2011: 335). Luhmann's analysis of systems differed from Parsons' in the following way: "While Parsons' system is metaphysical, Luhmann's system is not. Therefore, Luhmann does not conceive of the social system as a kind of of cosmological arrangement in which roles are regulated by an all-powerful regulatory mechanism. Also unlike Parsons, Luhmann sees social agency as the force that builds the relational networks that are supposed to encompass the "system" rather than to have that agency constrained by him. The unity found in any social system is not assumed by Luhmann to be sui generis on any basis, but rather results from collaborative or collective choices. In short, each author's focus is different, Parsons focusing on the systemic control of action while Luhmann emphasizes building the social system through action. While Parsons sees the social system as sui generis (à la Durkheim), Luhmann understands that it embodies collective praxis» (Murphy 1982: 301). This highlights the divergence in system analysis from a classical functionalist like Parsons and a neofunctionalist like Luhmann.

According to Luhmann, the social system has "structural autonomy" (Luhmann quoted in Wallace and Wolf 1995: 70). Luhmann argues that "self-referential systems are not just self-organizing or self-regulating systems... They exist as a closed network continuing to produce the elements needed to continue producing the elements" (ibid). However, Wallace and Wolf (1995) criticize Luhmann's very idea that societies themselves can engage in self-reflection as having a mind of their own. They argue that in the end it is people who think and promote social change through decisions.

Although Luhmann marginally addresses Weber's significant actions, he does not want to focus on people and their subjective experiences. His theoretical interest is in “units of communication” (Wallace and Wolf 1995: 71). Wallace and Wolf (1995) note that Luhmann is less optimistic about the future than Parsons. According to Luhmann, “the modern world is too complex for common norms or even generalizations of values” and he “criticizes Parsons for overestimating not only the functionally necessary social consensus but also the actually existing social consensus” (Wallace and Wolf 1995: 71). . It is “the general acceptance of schematized [or structural] contingency” that makes society and integration possible (Luhmann quoted in Wallace and Wolf 1995: 71). Wallace and Wolf (1995) contest the possibility of a consensus by experiencing the same uncertainties as those defended by Luhmann.

According to Turner (2007), Luhmann's functionalism can be attributed to the “General Systems Approach” because “it stresses that human action is organized and structured in systems. When the actions of different people are related to each other, a social system can be said to exist” (Turner 2007: 103). Turner also mentions that such an approach is also common at Parsons. A coherent system of action is integrated into a whole in terms of symbolic modes of communication, as for example by words. One would also find an incorporation of Parson's point of view in Luhmann's understanding of the social system, that – "all social systems exist in multidimensional environments, which constitute a potentially infinite complexity with which a system must contend" (Turner 2007 : 103). . Therefore, complexity reduction mechanisms must also exist to create a sense of order. Like most classical functionalists, this neo-functionalist also addresses this functional condition, viz. “the need to reduce the complexity of the environment in relationships to a system of related actions” (Turner 2007: 104). What makes Luhmann's approach different? Parsons and Merton belonged to the structural-functional school of thought. The former placed more emphasis on abstract and broad categorization, while Merton's functional orientation focused on a relative empirical understanding of the functional needs that must be met in certain situations (Turner 2007). Of note Turner (2007) "while all forms of functional analysis, whether by Parsons or Merton, have become recessive in American theoretical circles, to my surprise functionalism has seen a resurgence in Europe over the last decade, especially in Germany" (Turner 2007:102). The push for functionalism in a new way was sparked by Parsons' former student Luhmann. According to Luhmann, Parson's theory is too concerned with its own architecture and complexity, which has left it too divorced from empirical phenomena (Turner 2007). According to Turner, Luhmann's conceptualization is neither as empirically grounded as Merton's nor as complex as Parsons'. Yet Luhmann's scheme tends to «link empirical reality to its ends» (Turner 2007: 103).

Conclusion

Classical functionalism in sociology has been criticized in several ways. Neofunctionalism was born from the critique and reworking of Parsonian functionalism. However, in their critique of antiquated functionalism, neofunctions often overlook the important methodological contributions of functional analysis (Turner and Maryanski 1988). According to Turner and Maryanski (1988), neofunctionalists should recognize that functionalism provides a fundamental analytical tool for comparing different societies by listing "fundamental problems facing social systems" and this provides a common yardstick for such comparisons. It is a vain attempt by neo-functionalists to ignore or 'play down' the (however controversial) idea of ​​system/functional requirements, otherwise how could one 'capture, catalog and classify comparative data'? (Turner et Maryanski 1988).

References

  1. Alexander, Jeffrey. Neofunctionalism and After. USA/UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
  2. Bertalanffy, Ludwig Von. “The History and Status of General Systems Theory.” The Academy of Management Journal 15, No. 4 (1972): 407-426. 
  3. Bottomore, Tom and Robert Nisbet. A History of Sociological Analysis. USA: Heinemann /educational Books Ltd, 1979. 
  4. Collins, Randall. Theoretical Sociology. Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1997. 
  5. Murphy, John W. “Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann: Two Versions Of The Social "System." International Review of Modern Sociology 12, No. 2 (1982): 291-30. 
  6. Ritzer, George. Sociological Theory, Eight Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2011. 
  7. Shibutani, Tamotsu. Social Processes: An Introduction to Sociology. London: University of California Press, 1986.
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